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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 1977, the United States Supreme Court decided Wol-
man v. Walter,' in which the validity under the establishment clause of
a potpourri of Ohio statutory programs providing assistance to paro-
chial schools2 was at issue. Of the half dozen kinds of aid under chal-
lenge in that case, only two were struck down. The six state-funded
programs at issue in Wolman were: textbook loans;3 instructional
equipment and materials loans;4 speech and hearing services, and psy-
chological diagnostic services; 5 therapeutic sychological and hearing
services; 6 guidance and counseling services; remedial services;8 stan-
dardized tests and scoring;9 programs for the disturbed and handi-
capped;' ° and field trip transportation." Justice Blackmun delivered
the opinion in Wolman, which spoke for the majority only insofar as it
upheld diagnostic and therapeutic services and struck down equip-
ment and materials loans and field trip transportation.
With respect to the establishment clause standards to be applied
and the basis for upholding textbook loans and testing and scoring,
however, the Supreme Court is utterly fragmented. The Blackmun
opinion commanded the concurrences of only Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart and Powell. The Chief Justice noted a partial dis-
sent, 12 and Justices Brennan,13 Marshall, 4 Powell, 5 and Stevens16
* Member, Ohio Bar. Mr. Kancelbaum is a member of the firm of Berkman, Gordon,
Kancelbaum and Levy, Cleveland, Ohio. The author argued WVolman v. Walter before the
United States Supreme Court for appellants.
1. 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
2. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976).
3. Id. § 3317.06(A).
4. Id. § 3317.06(B), (C).
5. Id. § 3317.06(D), (F). Physicians and nursing, dental, and optometric services provided
under § 3317.06(E) were not challenged by plaintiffs.
6. Id. § 3317.06(G).
7. Id. § 3317.06(H).
8. Id. § 3317.06(1).
9. Id. § 3317.06(J).
10. Id. § 3317.06(K).
11. Id. § 3317.06(L).
12. 97 S. Ct. at 2609.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2610.
15. Id. at 2613.
16. Id. at 2614.
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wrote separatd opinions. A separate statement, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, was filed by Justices White and Rehnquist. 17 Be-
cause Wolman marks the end of almost a decade of consistent defeats
for new forms of grade school parochial aid, 8 the case provides a timely
occasion for a look at the current condition of the first amendment law
concerning aid to sectarian schools.
Despite their fragmentation, a majority of the Justices continue to
apply establishment clause principles in a way that forecloses substan-
tial government aid to almost all aspects of parochial education pro-
grams, regardless whether the aid is for core curriculum or auxiliary
services and materials, and regardless whether the aid is directly to
the school or channelled to the program via its pupils or their parents.
Even as it continues to sharply limit available aid to parochial schools,
however, the Wolman opinion creates new theoretical anomolies and
raises serious concerns for the potential abuse of those forms of assis-
tance now permitted. The Wolman opinions and the statutory programs
that they addressed will be discussed in further detail after a review of
the previous parochial aid decisions that led to this discordant result.
II. Everson v. Board of Education-TkiiE BIRTH
OF THE CHILD BENEFIT THEORY
The Supreme Court's initial foray into the jungle of parochial as-
sistance law took it down what, in retrospect, seems to have been a
doctrinal blind alley-the child benefit theory. In 1947, in Everson v.
Board of Education,19 the Court, in a five-member majority opinion by
Justice Black,2 ° upheld a New Jersey program providing publicly paid
commuter transportation of pupils to and from parochial schools. The
seminal Everson opinion, while propounding a strict adherence to the
Jeffersonian concept of "a wall of separation between church and
State, ' 21 concluded that the statute before the Court "does no more
than provide a general program to help parents get their children, re-
gardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from accred-
ited schools. 22
17. Id. at 2609.
18. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), in which textbook loans to pupils at-
tending parochial schools were upheld, was the last Supreme Court case upholding a grade school
parochial aid program.
19. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
20. Justice Douglas, who was among the concurring members of the Court, recanted in
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
21. 330 U.S. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). The
Court had much earlier approved a state grant of textbooks to sectarian school pupils in Cochran
v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930). This decision, however, preceded applica-
tion of the religion clauses to the states, and only the due process considerations of assistance
to a nonpublic institution were involved.
22. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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The majority opinion in Everson recognized that the busing it
approved approached "the verge" 23 of the state's power to constitu-
tionally assist religious education. Justice Rutledge, however, noted in
his dissenting opinion that the "social legislation" justification relied
upon by the majority was a "fallacy" 24 and foresaw that "this approach,
if valid, supplies a ready method for nullifying the [First] Amendment's
guaranty, not only for this case and others involving small grants in
aid for religious education, but equally for larger ones.""5 Twenty-one
years later, Justice Rutledge's fears were realized.
III. Board of Education v. Allen-
CHILD BENEFIT THEORY CORRUPTED
Although busing could be viewed as peripheral to the educational
and religious missions of parochial schools and thus upheld on that
26basis, the same could hardly be said of textbooks. Nevertheless, in
1968 the Supreme Court, relying upon Everson, upheld a New York
law that required local public school authorities to lend textbooks,
designated for use in public schools, to all pupils from the seventh
through twelfth grades, including pupils enrolled in private sectarian
schools.27 That decision, Board of Education v. Allen,28 marked the
apogee of the child benefit and social welfare idea in parochial aid
cases and articulated premises that would befuddle subsequent paro-
chial aid adjudications.
Likening textbooks to bus rides, Justice White, speaking for a six-
member majority, said:
The law merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general
program to lend school books free of charge. Books are furnished at the
request of the pupil and ownership remains, at least technically, in the
State. Thus no funds or books are furnished to parochial schools, and
the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools.2 9
The shaky factual underpinnings for the conclusions that the program
indeed involved an actual "loan," that the loan was to "pupils" and not
to schools, and that the schools were not financial beneficiaries of the
program, have all been thoroughly explored, both by the dissents of
Justices Black, Douglas, and Fortas in Allen itself,30 and by scholarly
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 52 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 57.
26. See Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1680, 1681-83 (1969).
27. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241-43 (968).
28. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
29. Id. at 243-44 (emphasis added, footnote deleted).
30. Id. at 250 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 254 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 269
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
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review.31 The aspect of Allen that was to prove most troublesome to
further development of establishment clause theory, however, was the
majority's unwillingness to "agree . . .either that all teaching in a
sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and re-
ligious training are so intertwined that secular text books furnished to
students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of re-
ligion. 32
The acceptance of the notion that the sec-alar component of
parochial education could be separated from the sectarian and thus re-
ceive governmental assistance was an irresistable invitation to state
legislatures to succumb to a host of new parochial aid proposals prem-
ised on the distinction between secular and religious instruction. The
ink with which that invitation was written, however, proved less than
indelible.
IV. BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS-THE EMERGENCE OF THE
THREE-PRONGED CURRENT TEST AND THE INVALIDATION
OF CONTEMPORARY PAROCHIAL AID SCHEMES
A. Entangling Safeguards
Board of Education v. Allen, insofar as it contained an integrated
formulation of first amendment theory, applied a two-Fart test. This
test was based on Everson and other earlier decisions, 3 but was first
articulated in Abington Township School District v. Schempp,34 which
concerned religious observances in public schools. Put succinctly this
test required that "to withstand the strictures of the establishment
clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion. 35 In the year following
Allen, however, an important third element was added to the test. In
Walz v. Tax Commission,36 which upheld New York's property tax
exemption for religious organizations, the Court added that the result
of such aid must not be "an excessive government entanglement with
religion. '37 This third prong of the tripartite test, "excessive entangle-
ment," proved critical in the Supreme Court's first confrontation with
contemporary efforts by states to expand aid to the core cost of teach-
ing secular subjects in parochial schools.
31. Freund, supra note 26, at 1681-83, 1685-88; Morgan, The Establishment Clause and
Sectarian Schools: A Final Installment?, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 57, 62-63 (1973),
32. 392 U.S. at 248.
33. See id. at 242-43.
34. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
35. Id. at 222, quoted in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 2,13 (1968).
36. 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
37. Id. at 674. In Walz, the Court noted that the "test is incscapably one of degree."
Id. It found that greater entanglement would result from abolition of property tax exemptions
than from the administration of the exemptions, which created "only a minimal and remote
involvement between church and state." Id. at 676.
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In a consolidated opinion rendered in 1971, the Court considered
the establishment clause validity of a Pennsylvania statute in Lemon
v. Kurtzman and a Rhode Island statute in Earley v. DiCenso." The
Rhode Island law authorized the expenditure of state funds to supple-
ment the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in nonpublic elemen-
tary schools by the payment of money directly to the teacher. The
supplement was limited to an amount not in excess of 15% of the
teacher's current annual salary, and the total compensation including
the supplement could not exceed the maximum paid to Rhode Island
public school teachers.39 Participating nonpublic schools were required
to submit financial data to substantiate compliance with these limits.
40
Teachers eligible for salary supplements were also required to limit
their teaching to subjects taught in the public schools and to use only
teaching materials used in public schools. Finally, teachers requesting
the aid were required to enter into a written agreement "not to teach
a course in religion" during the receipt of the supplements.4
The Pennsylvania statute, unlike Rhode Island's stipend to teach-
ers, provided for payment directly to the nonpublic schools. The Com-
monwealth Superintendent of Public Instruction was authorized to
purchase secular education services for pupils enrolled in nonpublic
schools by reimbursing those schools for their actual expenditures for
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and educational materials. Participating
private schools were required to maintain prescribed accounting pro-
cedures and were subject to governmental audit.42 Only specified
secular subjects43 were purchased by the state, and reimbursement for
any course containing religious teaching or sectarian morals or wor-
ship was expressly prohibited.44
The Supreme Court found that the very efforts of Pennsylvania
and Rhode Island to ensure that only the secular portion of the pa-
rochial school's curriculum received tax aid doomed both these
schemes by virtue of the excessive entanglement test.45 While accord-
ing ritual deference to the observation in Board of Education v. Allen
that "secular and religious training [were not necessarily] so inter-
twined that secular textbooks'. . . [were] in fact instrumental in the
38. Both cases are reported at 403 U.S. 602 (1971). They will hereinafter be cited
together as Lemon v. Kurtzman, except when necessary to refer to specific aspects of the deci-
sion on the Rhode Island statute.
39. Id. at 607.
40. Id. at 607-08.
41. Id. at 608.
42. Id. at 609-10.
43. These subjects were mathematics, science, modem languages, and physical education.
1d. at 610.
44. Id.
45. The Court perfunctorily noted that these laws had a secular purpose. Id. at 613.
It declined to consider whether the laws had a primary effect of aiding religion in %icw of the
conclusions concerning entanglement. Id. at 613-14.
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teaching of religion,, 46 the Court noted the extensive religious orien-
tation that had been determined to exist in the nonpublic schools in
Rhode Island47 and alleged in the Pennsylvania complaints. 8 It agreed
with the finding of the district court that the schools, overwhelmingly
Catholic, "constituted 'an integral part of the religious mission of the
Catholic Church.' A9
Beginning with the premise that such religion-pervasive institu-
tions were capable of excessively entangling relationships with the
states, 50 the Court reviewed the secularity restrictions imposed by
these statutes and concluded that "[a] comprehensive, discriminating,
and continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure
that these restrictions are obeyed and the First Amendment otherwise
respected." 51 The Pennsylvania statute was found to have the "further
defect of providing state financial aid directly to the church-related
school. '52  This factor was said to distinguish Everson and Allen, in
which the aid was provided to the "student and his parents-not to the
church-related school. ' 53 Finally, the opinion of the Chief Justice in
Lemon v. Kurtzman stressed the "broader base of entanglement of yet
a different character" presented by the potential of such laws to foster
"political division along religious lines [that] was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect."5 4
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan reiterated his simpler
three-pronged test for evaluating state laws under the establishment
clause.55 His test evaluated whether the governmental inducements:
"(a) serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions;
(b) employ the organs of government for essentially religious pur-
poses; or (c) use essentially religious means to serve governmental
ends, where secular means would suffice.",5 6 Brennan found that ir-
respective of the entangling features relied upon by the plurality, the
statutes under attack failed under at least the first and third prongs."
46. 392 U.S. at 248.
47. 403 U.S. at 613-16.
48. Id. at 620. Because the complaint had been dismissed in the Pennsylvania case.
these allegations were accepted as true for purposes of review. Id.
49. Id. at 616. The Court further noted that "parochial schools involve substantial
religious activity and purpose," id. (footnote omitted), and that "[relijious authority necessarily
pervades the school system." Id. at 617.
50. Id. at 616.
51. Id. at 619.
52. Id. at 621.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 622.
55. This test was first articulated in Abington School Dist. v, Schempp. 374 U.S, 203.
294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
56. 403 U.S. at 643 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Abington School Dist, v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 294-95 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
57. 403 U.S. at 658.
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Justice White agreed that the complaint in the Pennsylvania case
should not have been dismissed for failure to state a claim,5" but, be-
cause he was impressed by the Rhode Island district court's finding
that "none of the teachers . . . mixed religious and secular instruc-
tion," he regarded the potential of these programs to foster religion as
"an untested assumption of the Court."5 Further, he viewed the ma-
jority's condemnation of the state's entangling efforts to insure against
religious infusion as paradoxical.6 °
B. Insufficient Safeguards
The statutes considered in Lemon v. Kurtzman were unquestion-
ably drawn with a view to satisfying first amendment considerations
as then perceived by the proponents of state assistance to parochial
schools. The next round of decisions concerned a simplistic effort to
circumvent the obstacles to parochial aid imposed by Lemon. These
cases were premised on the notion that, if entangling safeguards
against religious infusion into secular teaching had undone the Penn-
sylvania and Rhode Island programs, the salvation of state aid lay in
removing the safeguards. To avoid the "further defect" of direct aid,
6
'
the aid would be channelled to the parents of pupils and not the
school.
In 1972, New York enacted measures that provided direct state
grants to nonpublic schools for "maintenance and repair . . of
school facilities and equipment to insure the health, welfare and safety
of enrolled pupils, '62 and provided tuition grants63 and state income
tax relief for the parents of children enrolled in nonpublic schools."
All three of these programs were struck down by the Supreme
Court in Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist. 5 Although it
again gave credence to the secularity of legislative purpose recited in
66the preambles to these laws, the Court decried the absence of any
attempt to restrict the use of the funds for strictly secular purposes.67
The Court repeated its previous declaration that "some forms of aid
58. Id. at 670-71.
59. Id. at 666.
60. Id. at 668.
61. Id. at 621.
62. 1972 N.Y. Laws, c.414 § I (codified at N.Y. EDc. LAw §§ 549-553 (McKinney Supp.
1977)).
63. 1972 N.Y. Laws, c.414 § 2 (codified at N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 559-563 (McKinney Supp.
1977)).
64. 1972 N.Y. Laws, c.414 §§ 3, 4 (codified at N.Y. TAX L~w § 612(c)(14XMcKinney 1975))
(amending N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(C) (McKinney 1975)), 1972 N.Y. laws. cA14 § 5 (codified at
N.Y. TAX LAW § 6126) (McKinney 1975)) (amending N.Y. TAX LAW § 612 (McKinney 1975)).
65. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
66. Id. at 773.
67. Id. at 774, 782-83.
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may be channelled to the secular [functions of parochial schools] with-
out providing direct aid to the sectarian," but warned that "the chan-
nel is a narrow one.,
68
The only secularity restrictions contained in these New York laws
were quantitative limits on the amount of aid available. The laws
limited maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment to thirty to
forty dollars per pupil and not more than fifty percent of the compar-
able public school expenditures. 69 Tuition reimbursements were lim-
ited to half the actual tuition paid by the parent. 70  Tax credits were
also limited, albeit less clearly, to a fraction of the probable parental
expenditure. 7' Thus, one could argue that the state paid for no more
than the secular portion of the facilities and costs of attendance. The
Court, however, deemed these restrictions ineffective: "[O]ur cases
make clear that a mere statistical judgment will not suffice as a guar-
antee that state funds will not be used to finance religious education."
7 2
Looking back at Earley v. DiCenso,73 Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, said that although the Rhode Island fifteen percent
teachers' salary supplements had been invalidated on entanglement
grounds, the Court had "made clear that the State could not have
avoided violating the Establishment Clause by merely assuming that
its teachers would succeed in segregating 'their religious beliefs from
their secular educational responsibilities.' "" The Court recalled the
admonition of Earley v. DiCenso that "[tihe State must be certain,
given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate
religion . . . ." and concluded: "[O]ur cases . . . have long since
foreclosed the notion that mere statistical assurances will suffice to
sail between the Scylla and Charybdis of 'effct' and 'entangle-
ment.' ,76 The Court dismissed the routing of tuition reimbursements
and tax relief to parents instead of schools as "only one among many
factors to be considered." 77 The key to the busing and textbook opin-
ions in Everson and Allen was held to be the religious "neutrality"
of those programs,78 which contrasted sharply wth the unrestricted
character of the aid at issue in Nyquist.
68. Id. at 775.
69. Id. at 777-78.
70. Id. at 780.
71. Id. at 767 nn. 18 & 19.
72. Id. at 778.
73. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
74. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779 (1973) (quoting from Lemon
v. Kurtzman [Earley v. DiCenso], 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)).
75. 413 U.S. at 778-79 (quoting from Lemon v. Kurtzman [Earley v. DiCenso], 403 U.S.
602, 719 (1971) (emphasis in text of NyquisO).
76. 413 U.S. at 787-88.
77. Id. at 781.
78. Id. at 781-82.
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Justice Powell concluded the Court's opinion by referring to the
"potentially divisive political effect""9 of such laws, but intimated that
"the prospect of such divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalida-
tion of state laws that otherwise survive the careful scrutiny required
by the decisions of this Court."'  He relegated this factor to the
status of a mere " 'warning signal' not to be ignored."8'
The Court announced several other decisions -on state aid to
sectarian institutions simultaneously with Nyquist. Two of these deci-
sions concerned state -aid to parochial grade school education.82
Sloan v. Lemon 3 invalidated a Pennsylvania tuition reimbursement
plan on authority of Nyquist. The parents of the parochial students
in Sloan sought to distinguish Pennsylvania's statute from the New
York statute struck down in Nyquist. The New York statute limited
the tuition reimbursement to impoverished families. The Pennsyl-
vania statute, however, made the reimbursements available to all.
Thus, the parents argued that it would not be reasonable to assume
that the recipients would use the grants for religious education and
therefore finance secular activities. The Court rejected this distinction.
Finally, on the day of the Nyquist decision, the Supreme Court,
in Levitt v. Committee for Public Education,84 struck down a New York
law that appropriated $28,000,000 to reimburse nonpublic schools for
the cost of maintaining enrollment records, health records, and other
records required to be kept by the state, and the cost of administering
and grading tests. The Levitt opinion, which was written by Chief
Justice Burger, contained two themes. The first theme was that the
"overwhelming majority of testing" paid under the act was "teacher-
prepared" rather than state prepared. 85  The significance of this fac-
tor was that "no means are available to assure that internally pre-
pared tests are free of religious instruction." 5 In the second theme,
however, the Court also differentiated testing from permissible busing
and textbooks on the basis that testing was an "integral part of the
teaching process." 8 7  The question whether standardized state-pre-
pared tests could be furnished was thus left open.
79. Id. at 795-96.
80. Id. at 797-98.
81. Id. at 798.
82. The other decisions, Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) and Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455 (1973), also decided on June 25, 1973, held respectively that a South Carolina
program for bond financing of college projects was valid, and that Mississippi could not
furnish textbooks to private schools under a statute that did not exclude racially discriminatory
schools from the program.
83. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
84. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
85. Id. at 475-76.
86. Id. at 480.
87. Id. at 481 (quoting Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Levitt, 342
F. Supp. 439, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 413 U.S. 472 (1973)).
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As a result of the 1973 round of Supreme Court decisions it could
probably be safely concluded that, with the anomolous exception of
textbook loans, massive state aid to the care of parochial grade school
educational costs, such as plant and salaries, was foreclosed.88
C. Auxiliary Services and Materials Struck Down
As a result of the demise of programs for funding the core of
parochial education, state fringe benefits to parochial education as-
sumed new importance. Such programs had been on the books for
some time 9 but no case dealing with them reached the Supreme Court
until 1974. In Public Funds for Public Schools v. Marburger," the
Court affirmed without opinion the decision of a three-judge district
court that struck down New Jersey's auxiliary services program. The
New Jersey legislature had authorized the state department of educa-
tion to lend materials and equipment to nonpublic schools and to pro-
vide public personnel within the parochial schools for the purpose of
furnishing remedial and corrective instruction, guidance counseling,
and similar services.9" Materials and equipment included such items
as projectors, filmstrips, television receivers, and the like.92
The district court found that although the equipment and mate-
rials were "inherently neutral" 93 they could be used "with equal facil-
ity in the teaching of religious studies. '94  Providing services of teach-
ers, although remedial, was similarly held invalid on the basis that
Lemon v. Kurtzman had prohibited the state funding of these ser-
vices.95 The Court viewed the content of the instruction as "not en-
tirely predictable" when delivered "within the confines and environ-
ment of a given religious institution where a religious atmosphere
may be pervasive. " 96
The following year, in Meek v. Pittenger,97 the Court upheld a
similar Pennsylvania scheme that also contained provisions for lending
88. See Nowak, The Supreme Court, the Religion Clauses vnd the Nationalization of
Education, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 883, 888 (1976); Piekarski, Nyquist and Public Aid to Private
Education, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 247, 248, 264 (1975).
89. For example, Ohio provided auxiliary services and materials since 1967. 0111o RItv.
CODE ANN. § 3317.062 (Page 1972) (repealed 1975).
90. 417 U.S. 961 (1974), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 29 (D.N.J. 1973).
91. 358 F. Supp. at 36, 39.
92. Id. at 38.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 39.
95. Id. at 40 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971)).
96. Id. The Court also struck down a provision for reimbursiig parents for the purchase
of secular textbooks. Id. at 34-36. This program was differentiated from Allen principally on
the basis that no similar reimbursement was offered to parents of public school pupils. id. at
36.
97. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
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secular textbooks to pupils.9 In Meek, Justice Stewart's majority
opinion reaffirmed the vitality of Board of Education v. Allen"' as sup-
port for textbook loans to pupils.' °  Thus, speculation that Allen
could not survive the evolution of the three-pronged test proved pre-
mature, despite the invalidation of programs that seemed less inimical
to church-state separation. The principles adopted by the Court to in-
validate the auxiliary material and equipment sections of the Pennsyl-
vania statute in Meek, however, dealt government aid to parochial
schools a devastating blow.
The Court bottomed its opinion-that lending materials and equip-
ment "has the unconstitutional primary effect of advancing religion"
-on "the predominantly religious character of the schools benefiting
from the Act."' 0 1 Although the Court in Board of Education v. Allen
had refused to conclude that "the processes of secular and religious
training are so intertwined that secular textbooks . . .are . .. in-
strumental in the teaching of religion," 102 a majority of the Justices
were now prepared to accept that very proposition. The Court stated
that "[it would simply ignore reality to attempt to separate secular
educational functions from the predominently religious role performed
by many of Pennsylvania's church-related elementary and secondary
schools and to then characterize Act 195 as channeling aid to the sec-
ular without providing direct aid to the sectarian."
10 3
The parochial schools of Pennsylvania were characterized in
Meek as "religion-pervasive institutions."'' 4  Their very purpose was
deemed to be the furnishing of "an integrated secular and religious
education; the teaching process . . . to a large extent, devoted to
the inculcation of religious values and belief." 0 5 Accordingly, the
Meek opinion concluded that "[s]ubstantial aid to the educational
function of such schools . ..necessarily results in aid to the sec-
tarian school enterprise as a whole."'
0 6
Turning to the provision of the Pennsylvania law that authorized
public employees to supply remedial instruction, guidance counsel-
ing, testing, and similar services10 7 within parochial schools, the Court
98. Id. at 352-54.
99. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
100. The textbook loan was viewed as materially "identical" to that upheld in Allen.
The affirmance of a contrary result in Marburger was explained on the basis that the reim-
bursement there was for the "purchase" of the books, whereas books were "loaned" to public
school pupils under the Pennsylvania scheme. 421 U.S. at 362 n.12.
101. Id. at 363.
102. 392 U.S. at 248.
103. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975).
104. Id. at 366.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Speech and hearing diagnostic services, also provided, were considered in dictum
to be probably valid as "general welfare services;' but were struck down with the balance
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held that the district court had erred in relying on "the good faith
and professionalism of the secular teachers and counselors function-
ing in church-related schools to ensure that a strictly nonideological
posture is maintained."' '  That the services were remedial, as well
as for exceptional students, and staffed by public employees was
deemed to diminish, but not eliminate, the "potential for impermis-
sible fostering of religion."'10 9
Finally, in Meek, Justice Stewart referred to the "serious poten-
tial for divisive conflict over the issue of aid to religion," engendered
by the Act,110 as an additional basis for its establishment clause in-
validity. Meek v. Pittenger set the stage for the resolution of the con-
stitutionality of the Ohio statutes at issue in Wolman v. Walter."'
V. WOLMAN V. WALTER
A. The Programs
Section 3317.06 of the Ohio Revised Code was enacted in August
1975 in the wake of Meek v. Pittenger and, in the words of the Wol-
man majority opinion, was "obviously .. .an attempt to conform to
the teachings of that decision."'"12  Ohio's General Assembly had pre-
viously enacted a series of parochial aid measures each of which had
been invalidated by the evolving Supreme Court decisions discussed
above. A salary supplement law,'1 similar to Rhode Island's, had
been repealed after Lemon v. Kurtzman.14  This was replaced by a
tuition reimbursement plan" 5 that was largely abrogated in Wolman
v. Essex.' 6 The tax credit scheme" 7 that was enacted to replace the
tuition reimbursement program was also invalidated the next year in
Kosydar v. Wolman."s
The eighty-eight million dollar appropriation that had been reallo-
cated successively from one to another of these appropriations was
then shunted to Ohio's auxiliary materials and equipment statute,"19
of the auxiliary services section because the Court could not "assume that the Pennsylvania
General Assembly would have passed the law solely to provide such aid." Id. at 371 n.21.
108. Id. at 369.
109. Id. at 371-72.
110. Id. at 372.
111. 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
112. Id. at 2597.
113. Am. Sub. H.B. No. 531, § 3317.06(H), 133 Ohio Laws 2298 (repealed 1971),
114. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
115. OHIo Ray. CODE ANN. § 3317.062 (Page 1972) (repealed 1975).
116. 342 F. Supp. 399 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 808 (1972).
117. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5703.052, 5747.05, and 5747.11.1 (Page 1972).
118. 353 F. Supp. 744 (S.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd mem. sub noam. Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S
901 (1973).
119. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.062 (Page 1972) (repealed 1975).
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which had been in effect and modestly funded since 1967. This statute
had been upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court 20 and was essentially
similar to the Pennsylvania law then under challenge in Meek v. Pit-
tenger.12 1 After the decision in Meek, however, the decision of the
district court rejecting the challenge to this auxiliary services and
equipment measure was vacated and remanded by the Supreme
Court. 2
3
While the remand proceedings were pending in the district court,
the 1967 auxiliary services and materials law was repealed and a new
Section 3317.06 was adopted. The furnishing of auxiliary materials
and services was retained, but substantially recast, and new programs
were added. Two types of assistance to be furnished under the new
law had already received Supreme Court approval. Textbooks were to
be loaned to pupils in nonpublic schools in a manner generally simi-
lar to that upheld in Allen and Meek, 24 and services that could un-
mistakably be categorized as neutral health services, including "physi-
cian, nursing, dental and optometric services," were authorized to be
performed by public employees working in the parochial schools1Zs
The balance of the programs was without direct precedent.
"[S]ecular, neutral and nonideologicar' instructional materials'2 6
and equipment, 27 "incapable of diversion to religious use," were to be
loaned to the pupils attending the nonpublic schools, or their parents,
on individual request. 28  Although this device sought to avoid the
direct loan to the church school condemned in Meek v. Pittenger, the
statute permitted the equipment and materials to be stored on the
parochial school premises. 1
29
Services under the new Ohio law were dichotomized between
"diagnostic" services, including speech and hearing diagnosis 130 and
psychological diagnosis13 1 on the one hand, and various therapeutic
120. Protestants and Other Ams. United v. Essex, 28 Ohio St. 2d 79; 275 N.E.2d 603
(1971).
121. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
122. No. 73-292 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 1, 1974).
123. Wolman v. Essex, 421 U.S. 982 (1975). By consent decree, the 1967 statute was
then declared invalid on authority of Meek.
124. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(A) (Page Supp. 1976). The Ohio law also per-
mitted the loan of a "book substitute." Id.
125. Id. § 3317.06(E). "Public health services" had been approved in dictum in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616-17, as well as subsequent decisions, e.g. Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 371 n.21 (1975).
126. OHio R . CODE ANN. § 3317.06(B) (Page Supp. 1976).
127. Id. § 3317.06(C).
128. Id. § 3317.06(B), (C).
129. Id. § 3317.06.
130. Id. § 3317.06(D).
131. Id. § 3317.06(F).
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services on the other. The latter included speech and hearing ther-
apy,13 2  guidance and counseling,133 remedial services, 34 and pro-
grams for the handicapped.1 35  Although the statute permitted diag-
nostic services to be performed within the sectarian school, 36 the
therapeutic, guidance, and remedial services and programs for the
handicapped were required to be performed "in the public school, in
public centers or in mobile units located off the non-public premises.""'
Testing and scoring services were provided under section 3317.06(D),
but unlike those condemned in Levitt v. Committee for Public Edu-
cation,138 the tests were limited to "standardized" items "in use in the
public schools." 3 9 Finally, field transportation was authorized to be
furnished or contracted at public expense.1
40
B. The Problems
1. The Equipment and Materials Dilemma
The equipment and materials provisions posed an insoluble di-
lemma for the Court. The section of the Ohio law limiting these
loans to secular material incapable of diversion to religious use added
no element not already passed on by the Court."4t  The parochial
parents in Wolman v. Walter, however, argued that nondivertible
items of equipment and material were functionally indistinguishable
from textbooks. 42  When textbooks were at issue, the distinction be-
tween a loan to the pupil and an outright grant had proved decisive.' 43
The Court in Wolman was faced with the necessity of either creating
a distinction of constitutional magnitude between a film strip to be
viewed and a book to by read, or permitting a totally formal and
ritualistic bailment to achieve exactly the result prohibited in Meek.
132. Id. § 3317.06(G).
133. Id. § 3317.06(H).
134. Id. § 3317.06(l).
135. Id. § 3317.06(K).
136. Id. § 3317.06(D), (F).
137. Id. § 3317.06(G), (H), (1), and (K).
138. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
139. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(J) (Page Supp. 1976).
140. Id. § 3317.06(L).
141. A similar restriction had been read into the Pennsylvania statute considered in
Meek by the district court decision in that case. which had declared the law invalid insofar as it
permitted the loan of divertible items such as projection and recording equipment. 421 U.S. at
357. This prophylaxis imposed by the district court was insufficient to save the statute before
the Supreme Court.
142. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. at 2606 n.16; Brief of Appellees James Grit ct al,
pp. 44-49, Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
143. Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), ani Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 340 (1975), with Public Funds for Pub. Schools v. Marburger, 358 F. Supp. 29 (DN.J.




The issues presented by the other major programs challenged in
Wolman were less fundamental and related more to the scope and def-
inition of the programs. Textbook loans were attacked on the basis of
the statute's inclusion of "book substitutes."'44 However, the record
contained assurances by the Department of Education that materials
furnished would be limited to the types approved in Meek and Allen,' 45
and the central thrust of the textbook challenge was a vain effort to
overturn those prior decisions. 46
The only diagnostic services challenged were "psychological"
and "speech and hearing" diagnosis. The basis for that challenge
was the failure of the statute or the guidelines to limit these services
to objective testing procedures that would minimize opportunities for
extensive interaction between public personnel and pupils on church
school premises.
147
The therapeutic services, being provided off premises, presented
essentially new issues for the Court. There would appear to be
nothing in the first amendment to prevent a pupil enrolled in a
parochial school from leaving the school to receive health or even
educational services at a public facility. Indeed, Professor Freund
had commented following the Allen decision that "[s]hared time in-
struction in the public schools, treating participating parochial school
children as part-time public school children" was one of the few forms
of public aid to parochial schools that should be sustained.14, Such
programs might pose dangers of entanglement and abuse, but were
not necessarily facially invalid.
Nevertheless, Ohio's off-premises therapeutic services presented
substantial problems of what may be considered a "neutral public
site" for the provision of those services. The appellants argued that
such services could be provided in public schools or other sites where
similar services were offered to pupils enrolled in both public and
nonpublic schools as a general program.149  However, curbside ser-
vices provided by mobile units, though nominally on public property,
raised the question whether a public unit stationed near a parochial
school, and devoted exclusively to its student body, was truly neutral
144. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(A) (Page Supp. 1976). See 97 S. Ct. at 2599 and
Brief for Appellants at 53-55, Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
145. 97 S. Ct. at 2600.
146. Id.; Brief for Appellants at 53-55, Wolman v. Walter. 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
147. 97 S. Ct. at 2602; Brief for Appellants at 32-39, Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593
(1977).
148. Freund, supra note 26, at 1691. This comment has been influential. See. e.g.,
Meek v.'Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. NVquist, 413 U.S.
756, 796 n.54 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
149. Brief for Appellants at 41-42; Reply Brief for Appellants at 13-14, Wolman v. Wal-
ter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
19771
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
and public; or whether such a location was vulnerable to the sectarian
influences on the public staff that would prevent furnishing such ser-
vices within the nonpublic schools. 50  Moreover, the use of public
facilities as a site where special remedial services were provided only
to pupils of sectarian institutions arguably conferred an impermissible
public benefit on a sectarian class. 5'
Finally, appellants attacked the provisions for testing and scor-
ing and field trip transportation. Appellants argued the testing and
scoring provisions constituted an "integral part of the teaching pro-
cess,' 152 which was invalid under the Levitt decision.'" Field trip
transportation was attacked as fundamentally different from commuter
transportation approved in Everson15 4 in that (1) the extent of public
aid provided under this program depended on the number and length
of field trips demanded by the church schools and was thus within
their unilateral control, and (2) as part of the curricular program of
the schools, such transportation necessarily aided the inextricably in-
tertwined sectarian portion of the education process.'"
C. The Decision
1. Textbooks Contrasted With Equipment and Materials
Not surprisingly, a majority of the Justices declined to overrule
the textbook decision so recently reaffirmed in Meek. 56  However,
part VII of Justice Blackmun's opinion, in which Justices Stewart,
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens concurred, flatly and opaquely re-
fused to extend the textbook rationale to auxiliary equipment and
materials, irrespective of the functional similarity between a book and
any other piece of material'" and irrespective of the similarity be-
tween the lending schemes.' 58 The Court resolved the conflict be-
tween the holdings on textbooks and other instructional equipment
and materials in one long footnote:
150. Brief for Appellants at 42-45, Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2f,93 (1977).
151. Brief for Appellants at 46-47; Reply Brief for Appellants at 13-14, Wolman v. Wal-
ter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977). See Moore v. Board of Educ., 4 Ohio Misc. 257, 212 N.E,2d 833
(C.P., Mercer County 1965) (astounding example of a de facto rierger between a public
school and a church school).
152. Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06(J) (Page Supp. 1976); Brief for Appellants at 49-50,
Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
153. See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
154. See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra.
155. Brief for Appellants at 51-52, Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977),
156. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2600 (1977). The "book substitute" argument
concerning the textbook provision was dismissed as untenable in light of the separate treatment
of books and other instructional items.
157. Id. at 2606 n.16.
158. The conclusion that the indirectness of the loan to pupils or parents did not save it




There is, as there was in Meek, a tension between this result and Board
of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 . . . (1968). Allen was premised
on the view that the educational content of textbooks is something that
can be ascertained in advance and cannot be diverted to sectarian uses.
Board of Education v. Allen has remained law, and we now follow
as a matter of stare decisis the principle that restriction of textbooks to
those provided the public schools is sufficient to ensure that the books
will not be used for religious purposes. In more recent cases, however,
we have declined to extend that presumption of neutrality to other items
in the lower school setting. . . . It has been argued that the Court
should extend Allen to cover all items similar to textbooks. . . . When
faced, however, with a choice between extension of the unique presump-
tion created in Allen and continued adherence to the principles an-
nounced in our subsequent cases, we choose the latter course.
1 59
Thus, without rationalizing, the Court baldly limited textbook holdings
to their facts. These holdings remain an inexplicable anomoly in
first amendment law, at least for the time being.
2. Services
Services fared better than equipment in Wolman v. Walter. Six
Justices accepted the proposition that "diagnostic services, unlike
teaching or counseling, have little or no educational content,""'
thus reducing pressure for sectarian intrusion. Furthermore, because
of the diagnostician's "limited contact"-principally involving objec-
tive testing-the Court said the relationship provided less "opportunity
for the transmission of sectarian views"' 6 and accordingly upheld
speech and hearing and psychological diagnostic services.
Justice Marshall departed from the majority with respect to thera-
peutic services, 16 2 and Justice Stevens joined the majority on this
point with "misgivings." 63 Five Justices, however, gave at least lim-
ited facial approval to furnishing therapeutic services away from the
parochial school premises. '6 The majority acknowledged that the
services were "analogous" to those condemned in Meek,16 but re-
garded the danger in Meek-that public personnel might advance reli-
gious beliefs-as resulting from "the fact that the services were per-
formed in the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the church-related
school.' 166  In contrast, the Court said that "[s]o long as these types
159. ILd. at 2607 n.18 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
160. Ld. at 2603.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2610 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
163. Id. at 2615 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
164. Id. at 2603-05.
165. Id. at 2605.
166. Id.
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of services are offered at truly religiously neutral locations, the danger
perceived in Meek does not arise."167  Accordingly, the Court held
that providing the services at neutral off-premises sites would not im-
permissibly advance religion because the "supervysion of public em-
ployees performing public functions on public property" would ob-
viously not amount to excessive entanglement.
68
The Court dismissed objections to the provision for a teaching unit
on a neutral site, for use only by sectarian pupils, on the basis that
the establishment clause does not foreclose "a practical response to
• . . logistical difficulties." 69  The majority viewed the "present pos-
ture" of the case as not presenting "any issue concerning the use of a
public facility as an adjunct of a sectarian educational enterprise.'110
However, the Court based this view of the record on the district court's
construction of the statute, concurred in by the majority, which au-
thorized services "only on sites that are 'neither physically nor edu-
cationally identified with the functions of the nonpublic school.' ,171
Wolman v. Walter thus leaves open the question whether a particular
site for the provision of services, though physically removed from the
parochial school, may remain educationally identified with it.
3. Testing and Scoring
The standardized testing and scoring authorized by section (J) of
the Act passed muster in the view of all the Justices except Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens. The majority felt that the inability of the pa-
rochial school to control the "content of the test or its result,"'72 pre-
vented the use of the test for religious instruction and eliminated the
need for excessively entangling public supervision.13 The Court
viewed the tests as serving the state's interest in assuring that mini-
mum standards are met, although the record was barren of any sup-
port for the proposition that the state monitored the scores for that or
any other purpose.
The teaching process in sectarian schools is regarded as inextri-
cably religious for purposes of providing services and materials. De-
spite the "integral role of . . . testing in the total teaching process,"'
17
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2605 n.14.
170. Id. at 2605.
171. Id. (quoting Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113, 1123 (S.D. Ohio 1976), af/'d in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wolman v. Waiter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977)).
172. Id. at 2601.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973), quoted in Wolman v.
Walter, 97 S. Ct. at 2601 n.8.
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however, the Court in Meek and Wolman considered secular knowl-
edge severable from sectarian knowledge for testing purposes. This
distinction tacitly assumes that although there is no way to prevent
infusing religion into the educational content of secular courses, the
state can, through testing and scoring, measure secular learning with-
out also measuring the sectarian learning. The inconsistency in this
approach, however, is that when the school authorities apply the test
results for purposes of grading and evaluating students, they will
necessarily employ state-furnished tests and scoring to further a course
of study that the Court in Meek and Wolman declared pervasively
sectarian.
4. Field Trip Transportation
Because the field trip transportation provisions of the Act neces-
sitated teacher involvement and lacked restrictions on timing and
destination, the Court held that field trip transportation was material-
ly different from commuter busing in terms of the risks of fostering
religion and the inability of the school authorities, without entangling
supervision, to prevent religious use of field trips. Accordingly, five
Justices declined to extend Everson to field trip transportation and
struck down subsection (L) of the statute. 76
D. The Partially Dissenting Opinions
Although a number of cases have greatly narrowed the permis-
sible areas of governmental aid to parochial elementary and secondary
schools, there have been sharp differences in the theoretical ap-
proaches used by the nine justices in this "extraordinarily sensitive
area of constitutional law."'177 Justices Rehnquist and White dis-
sented in Wolman v. Walter insofar as the case held any portion of
the Ohio law unconstitutional. 7 8  They did so in reliance upon their
separate opinions in Meek and Nyquist.179 These Justices believe the
establishment clause permits government to assist the secular portion
of the parochial school curriculum, and they reject the hypothetical
dangers of religious infusion as factually unsupported.
Chief Justice Burger also dissented from the opinion of the Court
in Wolman v. Walter, with respect to instructional materials and equip-
ment and field trips,' 80 but without opinion. Justice Burger's alliance
176. 97 S. CL at 2608-09.
177. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
178. 97 S. CL at 2609.
179. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 387 (Rehnquist, J., joined by White, J.. concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 805 (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting in part); id. at 813 (White, . dissenting).
180. 97 S. Ct. at 2609 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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with the views of Justices Rehnquist and White in Meek v. Pittenger'8
as well as Nyquistt 2 make it clear that the Chief Justice also rejects
the fundamental precept of Meek and Wolman-that aid to parochial
school teaching necessarily involves aid to its sectarian component.
Justice Powell, although generally sympathetic to the plight of
parochial schools" 3 and convinced that "in the 20th century we are
quite far removed from the dangers that prompted the Framers to
include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights,"'184 concurred
in the judgment except with respect to field trip transportation." 5
However, Justice Powell would not have limited Allen, but would
have permitted the lending of equipment and materials furnished for
the use of "individual students and at their request."'1
86
On the other end of the spectrum, Justice Brennan would have
struck down the entire Ohio law on the basis of its massive funding
alone, which compelled "the conclusion that a divisive political po-
tential of unusual magnitude inheres in the Ohio program."
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that diagnostic services
could be furnished by public personnel in parochial school premises,
but otherwise concurred with Justice Brennan. 188 Marshall's dissent
emphasized the undermining effect Meek had upon the rationale of
Allen, which he thought should have been overruled. 89 Justice Mar-
shall would place the line between "acceptable and unacceptable
forms of aid . . . between general welfare programs that serve chil-
dren in sectarian schools because the schools happen to be a conve-
nient place to reach the programs' target populations and programs of
educational assistance."' 190 Applying this test to the programs at issue
in Wolman, Justice Marshall concluded that the diagnostic health-
related programs should be upheld as general welfare programs.' 9 '
With respect to the "therapeutic" services, however, Marshall thought
that, even though they were furnished off-premises, these services
"would directly support the educational programs of sectarian
schools.' ' 192  Hence, these services aided the religious mission of the
school and must fall. 1
93
181. 421 U.S. at 385 (Burger, C.J., dissenting in part).
182. 413 U.S. at 798 (Burger, C.J., dissenting in part).
183. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. at 2613-14 (Powell, J., dissenting in part).
184. Id. at 2613.
185. Id. at 2614. Justice Powell regarded the majority rationale concerning state involve-
ment in the field trip as applicable only if the state paid the teacher who conducted the outing,
186. Id. (quoting Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. at 244 n.6).
187. 97 S. Ct. at 2609-10.
188. Id. at 2610-13 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. Id. at 2611.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2612 & n.6.
192. Id. at 2612.
193. Id. In Justice Marshall's opinion the remedial services for the handicapped were
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Justice Stevens rejected altogether the tripartite test that has been
accepted by at least a plurality of the Justices. Because he believed
the establishment clause must have a "fundamental character"'
94
Justice Stevens objected to any differentiation between direct and in-
direct aid or between textbooks and other educational materials.'9 5
Accordingly, he chose to revert to Justice Black's formulation in
Everson: "No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to sup-
port any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be
called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice reli-
gion."' 96  In Justice Stevens' view, the "Court's efforts to improve
upon the Everson test have not proved successful."' 97
It thus appears that Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan
would severely restrict parochial aid and would overrule Allen.
Justices White and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, on the other
hand, would permit large scale aid to the secular aspects of parochial
education at least in the absence of excessive administrative entangle-
ment. The present balance is struck by the positions of Justices Black-
mun, Stewart, and Powell, who uneasily prefer to isolate Allen rather
than overrule or extend it.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF Wolnan v. Walter
A. The Strategic Setback
For groups seeking to enforce the establishment clause, the most
important adverse consequence of Wolman v. Walter would appear
strategic rather than doctrinal. From Lemon v. Kurtzman'" through
Meek v. Pittenger,99 the Court had approached parochial aid schemes
broadly and facially, with a view to their potential for abuse rather
than their record of abuse in fact. In effect, the state legislatures were
required to guarantee that these programs would neither aid religion
nor foster excessive entanglement. 0 In Lemon, for example, the
Court held that given the "potential for impermissible fostering of
"clearly intended to aid the sectarian schools to improve the performance of their students in
the classroom." Id.
194. Id. at 2614 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). Justice Stevens had earlier announced
his strict establishment clause views in his dissent from the approval of a program of aid to
church-related colleges in Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
195. 97 S. Ct. at 2614.
196. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
197. 97 S. Ct. at 2615 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
198. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
199. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
200. This treatment contrasts with the Court's consideration of aid to church-related col-
leges and universities when mere possibility of unconstitutional application is insufficient to re-
sult in a judgment of facial invalidity. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679 (1971).
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religion" the State must be "certain" that the violation does not oc-
cur.201 Perhaps the clearest articulation of this idea appears in Meek:
We need not decide whether substantial state expenditures to en-
rich the curricula of church-related elementary and secondary schools
• ..necessarily result in the direct and substantial advancement of re-
ligious activity. For decisions of this Court make clear that the District
Court erred in relying entirely on the good faith and professionalism of
the secular teachers and counselors functioning in church-related schools
to ensure that a strictly nonideological posture is maintained.
20 2
Placing the burden on the state to "ensure" against constitu-
tional violation, although contrary to ordinary presumptions that a law
is constitutionally valid, has been extremely important to the practical
enforcement of church-state separation in educational institutions. If
the secularity of the parochial aid services performed by public per-
sonnel is perverted in the implementation of the program, neither the
beneficiaries of the service nor the teachers and counselors hired to
provide it are apt to sound an alarm. Nevertheless, under the doctrine
of Flast v. Cohen,z0 3 concerned taxpayers are entitled to complain of
this misapplication of public funds even though they may not readily
learn that it is occurring.
The practical result of Wolman v. Walter is that insofar as diag-
nostic and therapeutic services are now to be furnished to parochial
school pupils by the government, it will be necessary to find ways to
monitor the programs to discover abuses. Unlike the equal protec-
tion clause, which is often abused by clandestine patterns of discrimi-
nation unknown to the victims, the establishment clause is not pro-
tected by governmental investigative agencies seeking to ferret out
unconstitutional practices. 0 4 The enforcement of a proper administra-
tion of these programs will thus fall to cumbersome processes of civil
litigation.
The problem of assuring constitutional implementation is aggra-
vated by the fact that these statutes, as typified by Ohio's section
3317.06, tend to be implemented almost entirely at the local school
board level. In Ohio, there is no statewide control of the activities
of the locally hired staff beyond periodic inspections to confirm that
employees are properly performing their specialties. 20 5  Detailed rec-
ords are not centrally collated until after the services are furnished.
Consequently, the specter of multiple court tests on narrow issues of
201. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
202. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369 (1975) (emphasis added, footnotes deleted),
203. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
204. To the contrary, the United States has sought to have thee laws upheld because of
their implications for the federal Elementary and Secondary Educatio'l Act. See, e.g., Amicus
Curiae Brief of the United States, Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977),
205. Record 27, at 38, Wolman v. Waiter, 97 S. Ct. 2593 (1977).
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local implementation, which will involve extensive discovery, is pres-
ent.
206
In the past, parochial aid adjudications have been painted with a
relatively broad brush and, if not harmonious, the adjudications at
least have been clear. Hopefully, the mandate for diagnostic and off-
premises services will not obfuscate that clarity.
20 7
B. Implications for Federal Aid
Title I of the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965208 supplies federal funds to special programs for educationally
deprived pupils in public and nonpublic schools. Although the Act
does not mandate particular programs, leaving that to the state and
209local agencies, programs such as remedial reading have been funded
under it.
In Wheeler v. Barrera,1 ° the Supreme Court declined to adjudi-
cate the constitutionality of such programs within the parochial
schools on the basis that no specific plan was before it.211  That such
programs may not be constitutionally furnished within parochial
schools through federal funding would seem implicit in the Court's
holding in Meek v. Pittenger.2  Nevertheless, the Memorandum for
the United States as amicus curiae in Wolman v. Walter posited the
tenuous distinction that because the United States does not maintain
a system of public schools open to all children, it cannot fulfill its
obligation of religious neutrality without providing its benefits "to
students in public and private schools alike."213  As this article is
written, the establishment clause validity of federally funded programs
akin to the state programs considered in Meek and Wolman is being
tested in the Southern District of New York.1 4 It is difficult to believe
206. In Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), the Chief Justice mentioned the neces-
sity of avoiding pinning establishment clause adjudications on variable aspects to prevent "con-
tinuing day-to-day relationship" and "confrontations that could escalate." Id. at 674. To the
extent that the churches are dragged into a multiplicity of suits, judicial entanglement may be-
come a new church-state problem.
207. The recent abolition of the three-judge district court with its direct appeal to the
Supreme Court, by which most parochial aid programs have been tested, also threatens to in-
troduce a new source of confusion into establishment clause law by interposing new bodies of
law at the intermediate appellate leveL See 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) (repealed 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2284 (1978)).
208. 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-241o (1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
209. 20 U.S.C. 241e(a)(1970); 45 C.F.R. l16a.23(d)(1976).
210. 417 U.S. 402 (1974).
211. Id. The Court ruled that under the Act parochial school pupils are entitled to ser-
vices that are comparable, but not necessarily identical, to services furnished to public school
pupils.
212. 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
213. Amicus Curiae Brief of the United States at 6, Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593
(1977).
214. National Coalition for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Califano, No. 76-888
(S.D.N.Y., filed February 25, 1976).
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that the first amendment requires less separation when it speaks to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.
VII. WHERE FROM HERE?
In Meek v. Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter the Supreme Court
has made it clear that the parochial grade schools, as they presently
exist, cannot expect to receive governmental aid for programs or
material, other than textbooks and tests, for use within the sectarian
schools. Although church-related colleges and universities have man-
aged to receive such aid in forms that have been upheld against first
amendment challenge by a majority of the Justices, 15 it is unlikely that
the elementary and secondary parochial schools can recast themselves
to meet the standards applicable to institutions of higher learning.
The decisions approving aid to such institutions have dwelled upon
the college student's lower susceptibility to religious indoctrination,
as well as the greater departmentalization and academic freedom char-
acteristically found in colleges and universities. z 6 Even if the grade
schools were to attempt greater separation of secular and sectarian
functions than they have already achieved in their effort to justify
government aid, 217 the susceptibility of their pupils 2t8 combined with
a residuum of religious activity that is their raison d'etre would pre-
dictably defeat that effort.
The teaching of Wolman v. Walter with respect to off-premises
therapeutic services is that at least some programs that cannot be
furnished on church-school premises may be provided at a neutral
location. Thus far, the sponsors of sectarian day school education
have not generally sought widespread shared-time programs, pre-
sumably because removing the children to the public schools for part
of their regular instruction is inconsistent with the premise of a full-
time sectarian day school. 219 A danger created by Wolman v. Walter
is that its approval of satellite facilities owned by the public, but de-
voted to the use of a particular parochial student body, as constitu-
215. See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) state noncategorical grants
to private colleges and universities restricted against use for sectarian purposes); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (state revenue bonds to finance construction of secular facilities);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal grants for construction of secular academic
facilities).
216. 426 U.S. at 764-66; 413 U.S. at 743-45; 403 U.S. at 680-89.
217. In Wolman for example, it was stipulated that religion classes usually occupied
one-half hour per day, and that teachers were not required to teach religious doctrine in secular
courses. 97 S. Ct. at 2598. Note also the remark of Justice Stevens that these measures have
the "pernicious tendency ... to tempt religious schools to compromise their religious mis-
sion without wholly abandoning it." Id. at 2615 n.7 (1977) (quoting Roemer v. Board of Pub,
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 775 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
218. "This process of inculcating religion is, of course, enforced by the impressionable
age of pupils, in primary schools particularly." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971).
219. See Freund, supra note 26, at 1688.
[Vol. 38:757
SHIFTING CURRENTS
tionally acceptable sites for such services, may be viewed as an invi-
tation to place broader shared-time programs in such special locations.
This would avoid the general integration with the public school popu-
lace involved in normal shared-time programs. If this occurs it will be
necessary to litigate further what is meant by "sites that are 'neither
physically nor educationally identified with the functions of the non-
public school,' ,,220 and to determine whether the Court's sanction for
health-oriented therapeutic services at such locations extends to edu-
cational programs that more clearly embody the religious mission of
the school.
Unfortunately it is likely that, irrespective whether shared-time
or some variant thereof becomes the subject of the next major thrust
for government aid to religious education, there will be further efforts
to circumvent Wolman v. Walter by more specious means-just as tax
credits followed the invalidation of tuition reimbursements, and equip-
ment loans to pupils followed the striking down of equipment loans
to schools. It has been relatively inexpensive for the parochial sys-
tems to receive aid under unconstitutional laws because efforts to
achieve restitution of the unlawful expenditures have not met with
much success thus far.22 Protecting the public against programs that
unconstitutionally expend tax funds in aid of religious enterprises re-
quires that, instead of merely suffering the inconvenience of having to
receive aid in different forms every few years as programs are suc-
cessively struck down, the beneficiaries must be required to restore
the value of the unconstitutional grants. Further litigation to achieve
this result appears inevitable.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The profound philosophical differences among the Justices have
not prevented a unique combination of liberal and conservative mem-
220. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2605 (1977).
221. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Lemon 11), in which recovery of
unconstitutional parochial aid expenditures was denied because plaintiffs failed to pursue pre-
liminary injunction. The ability of parochial systems to receive aid under unconstitutional law's
is also affected by the aspect of Lemon 11 that dealt with the permissible scope of a federal
district court's injunction forbidding payments to parochial schools under an unconstitutional
state statute.
In Lemon II, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of retroactive injunctive
relief, which had the effect of allowing the parochial schools to obtain payments for expenses
already incurred at the date the district court invalidated the statute. In Levitt v. Committee
for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973), on the other hand, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's order permanently enjoining any payments under the New York statute declared un-
constitutional in that case, including reimbursement for expenses the schools had already in-
curred at the time the statute was struck down. Following the Court's affirmance in Levitt the
New York legislature enacted a statute that allowed the schools to recover expenses incurred
by them prior to invalidation of the statute, which was an obvious attempt to circumvent the
district court's injunction. In New York v. Cathedral Academy, 98 S. Ct. 340 (1977), the Su-
preme Court held the statute unconstitutional and refused to expand Lemon 11 to permit a state
legislature to modify a federal district court's injunction when the equities could have con-
ceivably justified denial of retroactive injunctive relief by the district court.
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bers from applying the establishment clause to prevent public funding
of religious education. Justice Stevens promises to preserve that sep-
arationist plurality, having accepted Clarence Darrow's view that,
"[t]he realm of religion .. . is where knowledge leaves off, and where
faith begins, and it never has needed the arm of the State for support,
and wherever it has received it, it has harmed both the public and the
religion that it would pretend to serve.' 222
Despite the criticisms leveled by members of the Court223 and
224commentators against the tripartite test, the test has served at least
to isolate all but the more peripheral forms of aid to parochial schools
from public funding, irrespective of the ploys and feints employed to
circumvent the first amendment. The singular important exception of
textbooks is now held to be unique. This disposition may be untidy,
and the observation that sophisticated attempts to avoid the Constitu-
tion are just as invalid as simple-minded ones225 emerges from Wol-
man v. Walter somewhat scathed.
222. 97 S. Ct. at 2614 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).
223. See, e.g., the opinion of Justice Stevens in Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. at 2614 and
the opinion of Justice Brennan in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 642 (1971).
224. See, e.g., Note, Aid to Parochial Schools, The Test Flvnks, 52 CIII-KENT L. Rt~v.
683 (1976).
225. Wolman v. Walter, 97 S. Ct. 2593, 2609 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)
(paraphrasing Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)); Meek v. Pittenger. 421 U.S. 349,
381 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 641 (1971) (Doug-
las, J., concurring).
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